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1

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE

Amici are law professors with expertise in international, extraterritorial, and privacy law. We share an interest in the proper understanding of the Charming
Betsy canon of construction and the law of extraterritoriality. We submit this brief to clarify how these doctrines
should be applied in this case, and to explain how each
independently bars interpreting the Stored Communications Act (SCA) to allow seizure of electronic data from
inside Ireland’s sovereign territory. We also wish to highlight certain flaws in the analysis the Government offers
in this case, which fails to account for Charming Betsy,
and espouses too narrow a view of the SCA’s focus, in its
effort to escape the Act’s acknowledged territorial
boundaries and authorize plainly extraterritorial conduct.
Biographical information for each signatory to this
brief is provided in the appendix.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Both the Charming Betsy canon and the law of extraterritoriality fit within a well-defined body of law this
Court has developed for determining how American law
applies abroad. These doctrines exist independently: one
aims to avoid unsanctioned violations of international
law. The other prevents the improper projection of
Petitioner and respondent have both lodged blanket amicus
consent letters with the Court. No counsel for any party authored
this brief in whole or in part, and no entity other than amici or their
counsel made a monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of this brief.
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American legal power beyond our borders. But they
share much in common. Both rest on a properly restrained understanding of the judiciary’s proper place in
our constitutional order, under which the often-delicate
issues of foreign affairs in lawmaking are properly reserved to Congress, not courts. And both are grounded
on shared insights the Court has gained over time about
Congress’s approach to lawmaking: Its preference for
“domestic, not foreign matters,” Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank, 561 U.S. 247, 254 (2010); its respect for other nations’ sovereignty; its regard for international law;
its inclination toward international collaboration; and
perhaps most importantly of all, its avoidance of international friction and strife—unless some overriding policy
need compels congressional action despite the risk of
such strife.
Yet the Government urges a departure from both the
letter and spirit of these doctrines in its interpretation of
the Stored Communications Act (SCA), 18 U.S.C. § 2701
et seq. The Government claims the SCA’s warrant provision conveys to it the power to seize private email communications, likely belonging to Irish citizens, housed in
an Irish data center, without Ireland’s consent or cooperation. And the Government contends that it shares this
international seizure power with state and local law enforcement officials. This based on a statute the Government admits has no extraterritorial reach, utilizing electronic storage and retrieval mechanisms that Congress
could hardly have conceived of, let alone authorized,
when the SCA was enacted.
The Government claims this is possible because, in its
view, these electronic incursions into foreign sovereign
territory simply do not count in the extraterritoriality
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analysis. As the Government sees it, the focus of the
Act’s warrant provision is limited to the “disclosure” that
occurs when Microsoft employees retrieve the data from
a computer terminal at Microsoft’s corporate headquarters in Redmond, Washington, and turn it over to law enforcement. Gov’t Br. 21–23. But this position cannot be
squared with the doctrines developed in the Court’s
precedents.
The first problem with the Government’s theory is
that—irrespective of the SCA’s extraterritorial reach—
the electronic seizure of electronic records physically located in another country is an exercise of extraterritorial
enforcement jurisdiction. That is a plain violation of international law, no different than if FBI agents set foot
on Irish soil to retrieve the data themselves. Under the
Charming Betsy canon, first enumerated by Chief Justice Marshall in Murray v. The Schooner Charming
Betsy, U.S. courts are constrained to avoid interpreting
“an act of congress” in a manner that would “violate the
law of nations, if any other possible construction remains,” 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804)—whether the
statute at issue is meant to apply extraterritorially or
not. Congress gave no hint in the SCA that it intended
for warrants under Section 2703 to authorize violations
of international law, and the Government provides no
reason to believe these violations can be ignored. Application of the Charming Betsy canon thus requires finding that the Government’s requested power to seize electronic records from Ireland exceeds the authority conveyed under the SCA.
The Government’s theory also has problems under
the law of extraterritoriality itself. Even if the ambit of
Section 2703’s focus were limited to “disclosure”—a point
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that Microsoft persuasively rebuts—that focus would
still incorporate the use of Section 2703 warrants to
compel electronic retrieval of data located in other countries. Section 2703’s text may speak only of “disclosure,”
but the power it conveys extends beyond the page, authorizing law-enforcement officials to compel providers
to perform an entire sequence of steps needed to effectuate disclosure. That whole range of authorized conduct
necessarily lies within the Act’s focus, and was the subject of Congress’s legitimate concern in crafting it. Accordingly, if law-enforcement officials wish to use Section
2703 warrants to compel disclosure of emails stored in
other countries, they need express authorization from
Congress to do so, which all agree Congress has not provided. The correct result then is to reject the Government’s position in this case.
That result is also necessary to remain faithful to this
Court’s precedents and the principles behind its extraterritoriality doctrine. The U.S.’s aggressive stance on
compelled disclosure of information stored abroad has
already created pronounced friction with other countries.
A Government win here would further stoke those resentments—and could realistically provoke retaliation—
at a time when Congress has indicated a preference for
détente and international cooperation through treaties.
Much remains to be developed in this area of the law to
promote legitimate law enforcement needs, to address
our sovereign neighbors’ security concerns, and to protect our citizens’ liberty and security. But only Congress
is properly equipped to deal with these sensitive issues.
That prerogative should not be handed over to judges or
federal law enforcement—and certainly should not be
enjoyed by the state and local law enforcement officials
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who are also empowered to use the SCA’s warrant provisions.
Rejecting the Government’s position is likewise essential to preserve assumptions about extraterritoriality
that the legislative and judicial branches have shared
since the Republic’s early days. These shared assumptions properly constrain law enforcement and other governmental actors. They also prevent the march of technological progress from introducing an extraterritorial
creep into laws that Congress intended to remain domestically fixed.
This is not to say that U.S. enforcement powers
should never reach into a foreign country. It may be that
borderless law enforcement is necessary for combatting
terrorism or certain types of transnational crimes. There
may be situations when no international treaty exists,
where bilateral cooperation is impossible, or where remote cross-border searches are necessary to prevent
criminal evasion. But none of those circumstances exist
here. And even if they did, a proper regard for the separation of powers—and the branches’ respective institutional competences—demands that Congress be the one
to make those calls.
ARGUMENT
I.

The SCA does not authorize law-enforcement
officers to violate international law by seizing
electronic data physically stored in another
country.

Because the Government agrees that the SCA permits no extraterritorial application, the Government’s
case begins and ends with an examination of Section
2703’s “focus,” the “second step” required in an extrater-
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ritoriality analysis. Gov’t Br. 17; see also RJR Nabisco,
Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2100 (2016). Yet
there is another canon of statutory construction that the
Government entirely neglects—and that resolves this
case: the Charming Betsy canon, which imposes independent limits on Section 2703’s reach. That canon prohibits interpreting U.S. statutes in a manner that would
violate international law unless Congress has authorized
the violation in the statute itself. And just such an unsanctioned international-law violation would occur if lawenforcement officers used Section 2703 warrants to seize
data physically stored in other countries.
A.

International law prohibits unilateral execution
of a warrant inside another country’s sovereign
territory.

Because a country’s authority within its boundaries is
“exclusive and absolute,” The Schooner Exchange v.
McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 136 (1812), “[t]he first and foremost restriction imposed by international law on a State
is *** [that] it may not exercise its power in any form in
the territory of another State.” PCIJ, SS Lotus (France
v Turkey), PCIJ Reports, Series A, No. 10, p. 19 (1927).
This restriction walls-in law-enforcement officials, prohibiting them from “exercise[ing] their functions in the
territory of another state” without “the consent of the
other state.” Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 432; id. cmt. b. B. Law
enforcement is an exercise of “enforcement jurisdiction”—the “most intrusive of jurisdictional claims.” Robert Cryer et al., An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure 44 (2d ed. 2010). And going
back to the Founding, it has been considered a fundamentally local activity. McKenna v. Fisk, 12 U.S. 241, 248
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(1843) (“‘Crimes are in their nature, local, the jurisdiction of crimes is local,’” quoting Rafael v. Verelst, 1058 2
W. Bl. (1055)).
Execution of a warrant in another country without its
consent is a paradigmatic exercise of enforcement jurisdiction, and a plain violation of international law. In re
Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Africa, 552
F.3d 157, 171 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting that warrants lack
extraterritorial reach); see also Jennifer Daskal, The UnTerritoriality of Data, 125 Yale L.J. 326, 354 (2015)
(“The overarching rule is that the judiciary’s warrant
authority is territorially limited.”) (citing authorities).
This Court has recognized this territorial limit on
warrant enforcement in its constitutional jurisprudence.
See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259,
279 (1990) (noting that a “warrant” is a “dead letter outside of the United States”). And Congress likewise observes this limit in lawmaking—as the SCA itself demonstrates. The SCA prohibits foreign governments from
enforcing their own warrants to obtain data in the United States, through its refusal to list turnover to foreign
governments among the disclosures permitted under
Section 2702. It likewise bans foreign governments from
obtaining a warrant in this country to obtain data located here. The SCA excludes foreign governments from
the list of “governmental entities” entitled to apply for a
Section 2703 warrant. And that ban is subject to only one
narrow exception—provided in the Foreign Evidence
Request Efficiency Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3512 et seq.—which
still offers no direct route to obtaining a U.S. warrant. It
instead requires that he foreign government ask the Department of Justice to obtain a Section 2703 warrant on
its behalf, 18 U.S.C. § 3512 (a)(1) & (a)(2)(B), ensuring
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that any foreign law-enforcement operations conducted
in this country will be subject to strict Department supervision.
The Government cannot sidestep these universally
recognized dictates of international law simply by conscripting Microsoft to conduct the retrieval on its behalf.
Where a private party conducts a seizure “by compulsion
of sovereign authority,” that seizure is “attributable to
the Government.” Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’
Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 614–615 (1989); see also United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 56/83, Annex, art. 5,
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts (2001) (“The conduct of a person or entity which is
not an organ of the State *** but is empowered by law
*** to exercise elements of the governmental authority
shall be considered an act of the State under international law.”).
The fact that retrieval would be initiated electronically from inside the United States, at Microsoft’s Redmond, Washington corporate headquarters, without
travel to Ireland, also does not change the seizure’s fundamentally international character. Such remote electronic retrieval efforts would still be “directed towards
consummation, and require compliance” in Ireland, even
if they were “initiated” in the U.S., and thus raise the
same “problem of enforcement jurisdiction” as “when a
State acts in foreign territory itself.” FTC v. Compagnie
de Saint-Gobain-Pont-A-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300, 1316
n.89 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (quoting Mann, The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law, 1 Rec. Des Cours 1, 128
(1964)). At bottom, using a computer in Washington to
retrieve emails from Ireland is a projection of American
enforcement power abroad—one reaching physically into
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the sovereign territory of another country to seize private property, the same as when foreign countries like
Russia illicitly access American computer networks from
outside the United States to steal our citizens’ personal
information.
Indeed, the Government’s dismissal of data’s physical
location as a peripheral concern in seizures is a departure from its own established position. In the Department of Justice’s manual on computer searches and electronic surveillance, the Department almost seems to
channel Microsoft when it advises that the location
“where the remotely stored data is located” is the key
consideration for determining the proper means to access it lawfully. Office of Legal Education Executive Office for United States Attorneys, Searching and Seizing
Computers and Obtaining Electronic Evidence in Criminal Investigations 84 (2009) (DOJ Manual). The DOJ
Manual cautions that when the data is stored outside the
United States, “the United States may be required to
take actions ranging from informal notice to a formal request for assistance to the country concerned,” id. at 85,
usually using methods provided under the sorts of mutual legal assistance treaties (MLATs)—like the one the
U.S. has with Ireland—that Government now derides as
ineffectual, antiquated, and irrelevant, Gov’t Br. 44–45.
The DOJ Manual elsewhere explains the need for this
cautious, consent-based approach, explaining that “in
general, law enforcement officers exercise their functions in the territory of another country only with the
consent of that country,” so unilateral action would be
improper. DOJ Manual 56–57. The Department itself
thus agrees that non-consensual searches of data located
in another country are a violation of international law.
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B. Under the Charming Betsy canon, the SCA’s
silence on these violations of international law
means Congress has not authorized them.
These principles of international law are not inviolate.
Congress “clearly has constitutional authority” to exceed
these “customary international-law limits,” Hartford
Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 815 (1993)
(Scalia, J., dissenting), and sanction international exercises of enforcement jurisdiction—if it so desires. But the
Court operates on the principle that “legislators take account of the legitimate sovereign interests of other nations when they write American laws,” and thus “ordinarily seek[] to follow” these “principles of customary
international law,” F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004). The Court therefore follows the prudent course, first charted in Charming Betsy, that courts should look for some “‘affirmative
intention of the Congress clearly expressed’” before allowing violations of international law. McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S.
10, 21–22 (1963) (quoting Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957)). The Court also construes ambiguous statutes “to avoid unreasonable interference with the sovereign authority of other nations.”
Empagran, 542 U.S. at 164.
Charming Betsy’s “practice of using international
law to limit the extraterritorial reach of statutes is firmly
established in our jurisprudence,” Hartford Fire, 509
U.S. at 817 (Scalia, J., dissenting). And it is “‘wholly independent’ of the presumption against extraterritoriality,” id. at 815 (quoting EEOC v. Arabian American Oil
Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 246, 264 (1991), applying even “if
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the presumption against extraterritoriality has been
overcome or is otherwise inapplicable, id. at 814.
Like the presumption against extraterritoriality, the
Charming Betsy canon is fundamentally about preserving the proper balance of judicial and legislative functions. Courts have no place entering the “‘delicate field of
international relations” absent Congress’s express permission. McCulloch, 372 U.S. at 21–22 (quoting Benz, 353
U.S. at 147).
Nothing in Section 2703—or anywhere else in the
SCA—provides the clear expression of congressional will
required to permit violations of international law. That
can only mean Congress has not authorized them. Accordingly, regardless of the SCA’s “focus” under extraterritoriality law, the Charming Betsy canon independently blocks the illegal exercise of enforcement jurisdiction the Government seeks to authorize in this case.
C.

The Government’s position is irreconcilable with
our international legal obligations and
Charming Betsy.

The Government never mentions Charming Betsy by
name, even to distinguish it. And it makes no attempt to
dispute any of these bedrock principles of international
law. Instead, it tries various ways of minimizing the obvious clash between its position on unilateral cross-border
searches and these principles of international law and
statutory interpretation. None of these efforts is persuasive.
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1.

No international treaty permits unilateral trans-state seizure of private electronic data.

The closest the Government comes to acknowledging
its obligations under international law is its reference the
Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime Nov. 23,
2001, S. Treaty Doc. No. 11, 108th Cong., 1st Sess. (2003),
2296 U.N.T.S. 167 (the Budapest Convention), to which
the U.S. and Ireland are both signatories. The Government asserts that the Budapest Convention obliges the
U.S. to adopt legislation allowing it to unilaterally seize
data located in other countries through production orders aimed at U.S.-based service providers. Then it
points to the absence of any implementing legislation enacted after the treaty’s ratification as a sign that Congress believed the SCA to already contain that requisite
authority. Gov’t Br. 47–49.
a. The Convention simply does not do what the Government suggests. The Government contends that the
authority for unilateral cross-border searches stems
from the Convention’s Article 18.1(a), Gov’t Br. 48, which
allows signatory countries to make provisions for “production order[s]” that their law-enforcement officials
may use to compel a person located in the party’s territory to turn over data within that person’s “possession or
control.” But nothing in Article 18.1(a) expressly authorizes use of production orders issued in one country to access private data stored in another country, even if within
the “possession or control” of a person located in the party’s territory.
That dooms the Government’s argument. Treaties
like the Convention must be “interpreted against the
background of the general principles of international
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law.” Baron Arnold Duncan McNair, The Law of Treaties
466 (2d ed. 1961); see also Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31.3(c), 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 (requiring that “[a]ny relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the
parties” be taken into account in interpreting treaties).
Those background legal principles strictly prohibit unilateral cross-border seizures. And those restrictions remain in force because they have not been overridden by
Article 18’s “express terms.” Joost Pauwelyn, The Rule
of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far Can
We Go?, 95 Am. J. Int’l L. 535, 541 (2001) (quoting
George Pinson (Fr.) v. United Mexican States, 5 R.I.A.A.
327 (422 Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928)). Interpreting Article
18.1(a) to allow unilateral cross-border data seizures
would thus be inconsistent with both the Convention’s
unambiguous terms and universally accepted principles
of treaty interpretation.
b. Interpreting Article 18.1(a) to allow production orders to reach data stored in other countries would also be
inconsistent with the Convention’s Article 32. That provision, entitled “Trans-border access to stored data,”
makes clear that the Convention leaves in place virtually
all preexisting domestic laws regarding warrant enforcement, and has virtually no effect on parties’ obligations under international prohibiting unilateral crossborder data seizures. Article 32 provides that unless a
party obtains the authorization of another party, it may
only access data stored in another country if that data is
“publicly available,” or the party obtains the “lawful and
voluntary consent” of a person with the “lawful authority
to disclose the data”—normally only the data’s owner. If
the data stored in another country is privately kept, and
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the searching party does not obtain consent, Article 32
provides no avenue to unilaterally access it. And the remainder of the Convention does not either. These strict
restrictions that permit access to data stored abroad in
only exceptionally narrow circumstances—no matter
what means of access are employed—cannot be reconciled with the Government’s broad view of Article 18,
which would allow law-enforcement personnel virtually
unimpeded access to data stored in other countries simply because that access is obtained through a production
order.
Article 32’s strict restrictions on cross-border seizures exist because the Convention’s parties could not
reach mutually acceptable terms allowing for anything
more. As the Convention’s Explanatory Report explains,
the issue “of when a Party is permitted to unilaterally
access computer data stored in another Party without
seeking mutual assistance” was “discussed at length” at
the convention. Convention on Cybercrime Explanatory
Report ¶293 (Nov. 23, 2001). But the drafters “ultimately
determined that it was not yet possible to prepare a
comprehensive, legally binding regime regulating this
area.” Ibid. The Government’s interpretation of the Convention thus requires inserting terms into the treaty
concerning matters on which the parties were explicitly
unable to reach consensus.
c. It is thus perhaps unsurprising that the Government’s only supporting authority comes from a snippet
culled from a Guidance Note that was drafted separately
from the Convention itself. Gov’t Br. 49 (citing Cybercrime Convention Committee, Council of Europe, T-CY
Guidance Note #10 (Mar. 1, 2017) (Guidance Note)).
Less surprising still is that this slender reed proves in-
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adequate to the task. The document, which declares itself
to be “not binding,” Guidance Note art. 1, provides that
production orders may be used to uncover “subscriber
information” located in other countries. But this reference to “subscriber information” does not implicate Article 18.1(a), upon which the Government relies. Instead,
its reference to “subscriber information” dovetails with
the terms of Article 18.1(b), on which the Government
does not rely. This is because Article 18.1(b) envisions a
different sort of situation, in which a service provider is
“offering its services in the territory of the Party,” ibid.,
but is not “necessarily located in the territory,” Guidance
Note art. 1—for instance, if Microsoft’s headquarters
were located in Ireland but the company still served the
U.S. market. In such circumstances, Article 18.1(b) allows law enforcement officials to obtain “subscriber information” even if it requires obtaining it from the provider’s home country. Budapest Convention art. 18.1(b).
Article 18.1(b)’s promise of access to “subscriber data” is also a far cry from the right of untrammeled crossborder access to non-U.S. citizens’ private emails that
the Government claims. If the Government were to demand that a party turn over “subscriber information,” as
that term is defined under Article 18.3 of the Convention,
it would receive only details about the subscriber’s identity, such as her name and address, along with her means
of electronic access and the services she consumes. It
would not be entitled to obtain the private contents of
email communications—because “subscriber information” is defined to exclude any such “traffic or content
data,” which remains private. Budapest Convention art.
18.3. This is consistent with the idea from Article 32 that
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such private data is largely shielded from unilateral
cross-border access.
As for Article 18.1(a), the Guidance Note envisions
that this provision will allow law-enforcement officers to
compel a person to disclose his or her own information,
not private information belonging to third parties. This is
confirmed by the Explanatory Report, which anticipates
that a production order issued under Article 18.1(a)
would be used to seize “information stored in his or her
[own] account,” not the information in some third-party’s
account. Explanatory Report ¶173.
The Government’s expansive interpretation is also at
war with other provisions within the Guidance Note. The
Guidance Note makes clear that production orders allowed under Article 18 are purely “domestic” in character—“to be provided for under domestic criminal law.”
Guidance Note art. 3.4. And the power to issue these orders is “constrained by the adjudicative and enforcement
jurisdiction of the Party in which the order is granted.”
Ibid. Indeed, the Guidance Note contains a savings
clause providing that agreement to the Guidance Note
would not constitute “consent to the extraterritorial service or enforcement of a domestic production order issued by another State.” Id. art. 3.3.2
2

The Government will argue that the Guidance Note’s reference
to “extraterritorial service or enforcement” is meant to address circumstances in which one party—the issuer of a production order—
seeks to force another party—the one in whose territory the data is
located—to seize the data on the issuing party’s behalf. But it is unlikely that the Guidance Note would devote time to explicitly addressing such rarely occurring circumstances. The better view is
that this passage speaks precisely to the issue in this case—namely,

17
Further still, the Guidance Note confirms that Article
18.1 was meant to overcome corporate legal barriers, not
geographic ones. It clarifies that “[t]he term ‘possession
or control’ refers to [both] physical possession of the data
concerned in the ordering Party’s territory,” and situations involving “constructive possession,” such as when
the data is housed by some “remote online storage service.” Guidance Note ¶173.
Taken together, these provisions in the Guidance confirm that international law’s territorial limits on seizures
survived the Convention. Geographically speaking, warrants extend no further after the Convention than they
did before. And if parties wish to authorize unilateral
trans-state seizures of data, they must instead look outside the Convention—to some law extending enforcement of production orders into other countries, or some
other treaty by which countries have mutually agreed to
allow the unilateral enforcement of production orders
among themselves. While the Guidance raises the abstract possibility that a production order might issue to
allow a party to recover data stored overseas, it is clear
in context that such unilateral access can only occur if
the party’s law already allowed for it.
The Government’s reliance on the Guidance Note also
requires a series of unsustainable chronological and inferential leaps. Nothing indicates that this document,
written in 2017, actually captured any signatory’s understanding of the Convention when it was enacted more
a party’s effort to enforce a domestic production order extraterritorially on its own, by ordering production of third-party data stored
abroad through remote access.
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than a decade and a half before in 2001—much less what
Congress meant still a decade and a half before then,
when it enacted the SCA in 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, tit.
II, 100 Stat. 1860 (Oct. 21, 1986). More fundamentally,
these stacked inferences of implied congressional intent
lack the express clarity that Charming Betsy and the law
of extraterritoriality each require before Congress can
be understood to have authorized extraterritorial enforcement or sanctioned violations of international law.
d. The Government’s view of Article 18’s reach is also
difficult to square with the Convention’s larger goals,
which aim to promote cooperation on remote searches
through MLAT procedures. The Convention broadly
adopts an approach that limits searches to data located
in the party’s home country as outlined in Article 19—
which only provides for authorities to access data “stored
in its territory.” Article 32 anticipates that when the data
is stored in another country, the best route to obtaining it
will normally lie through that other party’s “consent”—
clearly anticipating the existence of an MLAT. This consensus-based framework throws the legal barriers imposed by international law on cross-border searches into
high relief. The Government’s go-it-alone read of the
Convention, by contrast, goes against its consensusemphasizing grain, and renders the Convention’s provisions anticipating party consent—and their implicit references to MLATs—entirely irrelevant. Accordingly, the
Convention’s text and context both confirm that the
Convention never meant to authorize unilateral crossborder searches, and does not reflect any understanding
that the SCA does so either.
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2.

The Government’s analogy to civil subpoenas fails.

Equally flawed is the Government’s attempt to close
the distance between its position and the dictates of international law by analogizing Section 2703 warrants to
civil subpoenas of a company’s own business records.
The Government points to lower court decisions authorizing use of these subpoenas to compel collection of information stored abroad, Gov’t Br. 14, 32–34, calling this
the “backdrop” against which the SCA was enacted, id.
at 32. But the subpoena analogy is a bad one for the Government, as it only highlights the perils of the Government’s neglect of the Charming Betsy canon by illustrating how lower courts have neglected it too.
Subpoenas ordering parties to produce documents or
data physically located in other countries may not generally be considered exercises of extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction, as they are usually issued at the behest of private parties, not government officials. But
they are nonetheless viewed by virtually every other
country as a violation of national sovereignty. International Law Association, Report of the Fifty-First Conference 407 (1965) (“It is difficult to find any authority under international law for the issuance of orders compelling the production of documents from abroad. The documents are admittedly located in the territory of another
state.”). They are also likely a violation of the international legal principle of nonintervention, which prohibits
all acts intended “to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights and to secure from it advantages of any
kind.” United Nations, General Assembly, Resolution
2625 (XXV), annex, Declaration on Principles of Inter-
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national Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter
of the United Nations (Oct. 24, 1970).
Even if judicially sanctioned international incursions
via subpoena were not violations of international law,
they would still offend “comity”—“the respect sovereign
nations afford each other by limiting the reach of their
laws.” Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 817 (Scalia, J., dissenting). “That comity is exercised by legislatures when they
enact laws,” and courts likewise “assume it has been exercised” when executing their judicial functions. Ibid.
(citing J. Story, Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws §
38 (1834), emphasis added).
Comity is as binding on courts as statutory law. As
Justice Cardozo explained while still on the New York
Court of Appeals in Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of New
York, “[t]he misleading word ‘comity’ has been responsible for much *** trouble” by suggesting, wrongly, that
courts have discretion to disregard international comity.
224 N.Y. 99, 111 (1918). To the contrary, only the Legislature possesses such discretion. But Congress has done
nothing to extend the civil subpoena power internationally. Nothing suggests Congress would sanction such power either, because of the pronounced friction the U.S.’s
international discovery practices have provoked. “No aspect of the extension of the American legal system beyond the territorial frontier of the United States has given rise to so much friction” as broad U.S. discovery in
international cases. Restatement (Third) of the Foreign
Relations Law of the United States § 442, Reporters’
Note 1 (1987). This is not just abstract theorizing. Foreign nations and the European Commission itself have
written to express their view that our civil data-collection
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efforts are akin to foreign invasion: “a territorial encroachment without justification, one which is exacerbated by the sharp differences in the legal status of personal
data in the U.S. and EU.” Albrecht C.A. Amicus Br. 10;
see also Ireland C.A. Amicus Br. 7.
Some countries have gone so far as to enact blocking
statutes in direct response to U.S. courts’ exorbitant discovery practices, Gary B. Born & Peter B. Rutledge, International Civil Litigation in U.S. Courts 969–978 (5th
ed. 2011). One such statute, Article 1A of French Penal
Code Law No. 80-538, expressly prohibits turning over
information absent a treaty or other international
agreement, an obvious manifestation “of French displeasure with American pre-trial discovery procedures.”
Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503, 508 (N.D. Ill.
1984). And when the European Union’s General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR) goes into effect in May, it
will pose further barriers to enforcement of civil subpoenas abroad, generally refusing to permit enforcement of
a “judgment of a court *** requiring a [provider] to
transfer or disclose personal data” unless the order is
“based on an international agreement.” Commission
Regulation 2016/679, art. 48, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 64. While
the European Commission explains in its brief that there
are derogations in the GDPR that could in some cases
allow compliance with a unilateral U.S. warrant, those
derogations are limited and apply only on a case-by-case
basis. Indeed, just two weeks ago, the French Government issued a statement declaring that the Government’s position in this case risked a significant conflict
with the GDPR. États-Unis – Union européenne - Q&R
- Extrait du point de presse (Jan. 4, 2018),
<https://goo.gl/ferJG8>. These strong international re-
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actions demonstrate that when it comes to international
discovery and evidence gathering, the United States is
resented as an outlier.
Charming Betsy’s insight stems from the recognition
that Congress is cognizant of these potential foreignaffairs flare-ups, and normally seeks to avoid them, not
stoke them. That assumption is only reinforced through
the Senate’s ratification of MLATs whose whole reason
for being is to respect the sovereignties of other countries and smooth international friction by setting terms
under which the gathering of evidence abroad can be
done consensually. To take Congress’s silence regarding
international enforcement of civil subpoenas as approval
of these internationally condemned practices flies in the
face of Charming Betsy and its insights about Congress’s approach to lawmaking. The subpoena analogy is
therefore poor ground for the Government to build its
case upon.
To stress this unsound foundation still further, and
enlarge this projection of U.S. power into the area of
Section 2703 warrants is far worse, because warrants are
much more significant intrusions nations’ sovereignty
and the liberties of their citizens than subpoenas. Unlike
civil subpoenas, warrants are a tool of criminal law enforcement. And unlike subpoenas, they are not restricted
to searches of property belonging to companies that are
subject to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts—implying that
the subject of the subpoena has some U.S. connection. If
the Government is correct, Section 2703 warrants would
allow seizures of data from anywhere in the world, and
because providers often keep such data near their customers, Resp. Br. 7, that effectively empowers U.S. officials to investigate any foreign citizen. Allowing that re-
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sult will only produce additional friction. It will also likely invite retaliation from other countries that will be
tempted to seize our citizens’ data through providers like
Microsoft located in their territories, and would likely do
so without bothering to respecting our citizens’ constitutional rights, which limit the power of our government,
not theirs.
In short, reading the Stored Communications Act in a
way that reaches foreign-stored data guarantees the
very clash with international law Charming Betsy
sought to avoid. If Congress wishes to authorize such
broad, unilateral law enforcement powers instead of engaging in cooperative treaty solutions, so be it. But Congress gets to make that decision. For courts to insert
themselves into these sensitive and important foreign
policy decisions is inappropriate. This Court should decline the Government’s invitation to do so.
II. Transnational seizures of private electronic data
also exceed the SCA’s territorial boundaries.
The Government’s analysis of the law of extraterritoriality does not disregard the doctrine outright—as it
does with Charming Betsy. But it still refuses to fully
engage in the “focus” analysis this Court demands to ensure purely domestic laws remain domestic, and are not
applied extraterritorially. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 136 S. Ct.
2010. The Government frames the SCA’s warrant provisions as focused only on “disclosure,” solely because Section 2703 uses the term “disclosure.” And because the
Government sees “disclosure” as occurring only in the
United States, that legerdemain allows the Government
to free itself from the SCA’s acknowledged territorial
boundaries, authorizing it—along with state and local
law-enforcement officials—to physically seize data from
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anywhere in the world. But the Government misunderstands the focus analysis, and its narrow conception of
Section 2703’s focus is unsupportable. Even if the Government is right that Section 2703’s focus is restricted to
disclosure, seizing foreign citizens’ private emails located
in foreign countries still cannot be ignored as the inconsequential byproduct of that disclosure.
A.

The Government’s effort to sanction the
unilateral seizure of private emails of foreign
citizens stored abroad impermissibly narrows the
focus inquiry.

The flaws in the Government’s focus analysis begin
with its failure to recognize that the SCA is a product of
its time. When Congress enacted the SCA in 1986, it did
not “intend that the Act regulate activities conducted
outside the territorial United States.” H.R. Rep. No. 99647, at 32–33 (1986). Its provisions regarding access to
stored wire and electronic communications were “intended to apply only to access within the territorial
States.” Ibid. Back then, the ability to transmit and store
electronic information abroad—a seamless process in
today’s world of non-localized “cloud computing”—did
not even exist. Pet. App. 14a. And federal criminal lawenforcement was considered largely a domestic, rather
than international, affair. See National Commission of
Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, Final Report 21
(1971) (“[T]he issue of extraterritorial application of the
federal criminal law is one which does not arise frequently.”). From this historical perspective, it must be assumed
that Congress anticipated the SCA to apply only to the
domestic storage of data—and purely domestic disclosures of data. Indeed, that is the only explanation for
Congress’s decision to allow state and local law enforce-
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ment to use the SCA. Congress could never have conceived of, let alone authorized, retrievals of communications stored in foreign countries.
The Government’s effort to prove otherwise strips
Section 2703 of this larger historical context. At best, this
effort is merely a guess about what Congress’s focus
would have been, and the laws Congress would have enacted, if it could have anticipated the technological
changes that would occur a generation later with the
globalization of data—exactly the sort of “speculation”
and “divining what Congress would have wanted” that
the Court properly prohibits. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 261.
At worst, the Government’s position is a transparent attempt to change the focus analysis’s basic purpose, and
unnaturally restrict the scope of conduct that might be
deemed extraterritorial, simply so that it might evade
the SCA’s domestic limits. But the focus analysis reinforced the territorial boundaries of purely domestic laws;
it provides no means to evade them. Indeed, just as Morrison demonstrates that the law of extraterritorially
does not lose its bite simply upon encountering some
domestic conduct, it surely is not so craven as to flinch
before such transparent efforts to nullify the presumption.
The Government’s narrow view of what “disclosure”
entails presents separate problems. Disclosure cannot be
understood as solely the act of turning data over to the
government viewed in isolation. Disclosure involves a
whole series of steps—including the retrieval of the underlying data from storage—that must be performed to
effectuate the disclosure. Law-enforcement officials’ authority to compel these actions comes exclusively from
the SCA. Accordingly, that entire range of conduct is
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properly viewed as within Congress’s “focus,” and is thus
subject to the SCA’s acknowledged domestic limits.
The Government’s contrary view that “disclosure” refers only to the isolated act of turning data over to the
government, simply because the term actually appears
on the page in Section 2703, Gov’t Br. 22–23, is ultimately
grounded on the focus analysis conducted in cases like
Morrison and RJR Nabisco, Gov’t Br. 19–20. Certainly
both of those cases restricted their analysis to the language of specific statutory provisions. RJR Nabisco, 136
S. Ct. 2101–2103; Morrison, 561 U.S. at 262–265. And the
narrow, text-focused inquiry employed in Morrison and
RJR Nabisco was not only permissible for the statutes at
issue in those cases, but necessary to protect their territorial limits. Such statutes subject private parties to liability, and may involve factual scenarios involving actors
and conduct occurring in a variety of countries. Confining the focus of such statutes to their specific terms is
essential to ensure that their territorial boundaries are
respected, and that foreign nations, and foreign transactions, are not subjected to liability without congressional
approval.
That said, there are clues right in the SCA’s text that
Congress views “disclosure” entailing more than simply
turning data over to the government. The Act recognizes
that disclosure involves all the steps needed to compel
the “execution of a search warrant” by the provider on
the Government’s behalf, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(g), including
the retrieval of the underlying data from “electronic
storage,” id. § 2703(a).
But even if these textual clues were absent, an examination of the SCA’s focus must consider the entire realm
of conduct it authorizes. This is because the analysis re-
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quired for domestic statutes like the SCA, which convey
power to public government officials, is necessarily more
searching than a simple examination of the text, requiring instead a consideration of the context in which that
power will be exercised. And when a domestic statute
authorizes governmental actors to undertake a particular
sequence of conduct, the entire sequence of authorized
conduct must be understood as within the statute’s focus,
and confined to the statute’s territorial limits, even when
some of that authority is necessarily implied.
So it was in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569
U.S. 108 (2013). There the Court was tasked with deciding whether the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), 28 U.S.C. §
1350, a law with no “extraterritorial reach,” Kiobel, 569
U.S. at 118, authorizes causes of action for violations of
the law of nations occurring entirely within the territory
of a foreign sovereign. That question could not be resolved from the ATS’s text alone, because the ATS is
“strictly jurisdictional,” Kiobel, 166 U.S. at 116 (quoting
Sosa v. Alvarez–Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 713 (2004)), conveying power to district courts to entertain claims. It
does not “expressly provide any causes of action.” Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 115 (emphasis added). The Act is silent
about whether it covered violations of the law of nations
occurring abroad.
Thus, the Court explained, a different kind of analysis was necessary from cases like Morrison, which involved a statute “regulating conduct,” Kiobel, 569 U.S. at
116 (citing Aramco, 499 U.S. at 246, not one concerning
“a question of jurisdiction” conveyed to a court. Ibid. (citing Morrison, 561 U.S. at 254). And, the Court explained, that difference demanded that it go well beyond
deciding “what Congress has done” in the ATS itself,
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ibid., since Congress did not address extraterritorial
claims specifically. Rather, it required determining what
“courts may do” with the authority Congress had conveyed to them through the jurisdiction provided by the
ATS, ibid. The Court thus looked to the full range of
“what courts may do” in applying the ATS to determine
whether it was being applied extraterritorially—whether
those things were specifically enumerated in the statute
or not.
Kiobel’s approach translates exactly to this case. Determining whether law-enforcement may undertake
cross-border seizures under a Section 2703 warrant is
less a question of what Congress itself has done—in the
precise language of the statute—to regulate such
searches, but what it authorizes those law-enforcement
officials to do in the real world, and whether lawenforcement officials have exercised that authority in a
manner that exceeds the SCA’s territorial boundaries.
And that broader, functional view of Congress’s focus is
essential to ensure that government officials do not exceed the statutory authority Congress has conveyed to
them. When, as here, a portion of that authorized conduct occurs abroad, it exceeds the power conveyed by
Congress.
B. The principles that drive extraterritoriality
analysis support this broad reading of Section
2703’s focus.
That conclusion is only reinforced by the principles
underlying the extraterritorially analysis. These principles “constrain courts,” Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 116, and
ought to inform determinations of about the “focus” of
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domestic statutes like the SCA just as they inform determinations about whether those statutes are domestic.
Those principles powerfully counsel in favor of taking
a broad view of the SCA’s applicable focus in this case, to
incorporate all conduct authorized in effectuating “disclosure.” That result will best avoid friction with other
countries—and clashes between our laws and theirs—
and it will protect Congress’s prerogatives in lawmaking,
so that domestic statutes like the SCA do not slip their
territorial boundaries through extraterritorial application.
1.

The Government’s approach invites clashes with foreign nations without congressional authorization.

The Court strains to avoid interpretations of “U.S.
law that carr[y] foreign policy consequences not clearly
intended” by Congress. Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 116. And it is
wary of interpreting statutes in ways that avoid producing “friction” with foreign countries, RJR Nabisco, 136
S. Ct. at 2106–2108. But the Government’s reading of the
SCA introduces just these kinds of unintended foreignpolicy consequences and friction with other nations. Issues concerning the handling of foreign citizens’ personal
data, and conducting law-enforcement actions abroad,
will naturally arouse the suspicion of foreign sovereigns.
Those issues arise here in an international environment
already inflamed by this country’s aggressive stance on
civil discovery. To feed those flames by extending that
stance into the far more intrusive criminal context is a
terrible idea. And allowing the Government to implement this policy without being forced to make its case to
Congress why such intrusion is necessary will invite
abuse and overreach, especially when the targets of
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these law-enforcement activities will virtually always be
foreign nationals who lack strong voices in our national
government. That incentive toward overreach will in
turn increase the risk of retaliation, potentially fostering
an ever-escalating conflict. Consideration of these “adverse foreign policy consequences” should leave the
Court reluctant to rule in the Government’s favor. Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 124 (quoting Sosa, 542 U.S. at 727–728).
Extending our warrant power to collect data stored
abroad—thereby imposing our laws regarding the collection of data in other countries—will also produce direct
clashes with other countries’ legal regimes. By law and
by treaty, other countries have different rules for protecting digital property, and different rules for courtcompelled disclosure of information. Anthony J. Colangelo, Absolute Conflicts of Law, 91 Ind. L. J. 719, 734–
735 (2016). In many such situations, compliance with one
law will invariably lead to violation of the other. Ibid. (describing “procedural absolute conflicts of law” where
“one state’s litigation-oriented discovery order compels
production of information and another state’s litigationoriented law prevents the production of that information”). That could put many American electronic service providers like Microsoft in impossible situations,
with potentially criminal consequences, when they do
business abroad. And the only assurance that the Government offers to assuage these concerns—that such
clashes have not happened yet—offers cold comfort, and
contradicts concerns that Government itself has raised in
other forums. Law Enforcement Access to Data Stored
Across Borders: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on
Crime and Terrorism (May 24, 2017), at 50:30–51:40,
<goo.gl/T7Ai7u> (testimony of Brad Wiegmann, Deputy
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Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice) (stating that
“when U.S. authorities are seeking data overseas,” there
is always least the “potential for conflicts”). Such potential regulatory nightmares strongly indicate that “if
Congress intended such foreign application ‘it would
have addressed the subject of conflicts with foreign laws
and procedures’” itself, Morrison, 561 U.S. at 269 (quoting Aramco, 499 U.S. at 256).
Finally, if history is any guide, a ruling for the Government that sanctions unilateral international seizures
under Section 2703 could have real-world consequences
for ongoing international efforts to address these pressing issues and bring harmony to this area of international law, “a matter of increasing importance in an ever
more interdependent world.” Sosa, 542 U.S. at 761
(2004) (Breyer, J., concurring). In the past, when courts
have rejected government arguments for extending domestic statutes extraterritorially, those refusals have
served as encouragement for the U.S. to engage in bilateral or multilateral efforts to overcome these limitations.
See Tonya Putnam, Courts Without Borders 6 (2016). A
ruling for the Government will diminish any incentive for
the U.S. to come to the bargaining table, and undermine
the international forces working toward harmony.
2.

The Government’s approach undermines
the separation of powers and shared assumptions about Congress’s approach to
lawmaking.

Adopting the Government’s wooden approach to extraterritoriality, and its narrow position on the SCA’s focus, will also put serious strain on the separation of powers, in ways that Congress is presumed to avoid in enacting statutes. Requiring courts to authorize Section 2703
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warrants allowing for the seizure of data physically located in other countries would force them into disputes
with other countries on extraordinarily sensitive foreignaffairs issues. It would be odd indeed for Congress to assign these issues to federal district courts, especially
without equipping them with mechanisms to reduce that
friction.
And courts should not assume those responsibilities
for themselves. These foreign-affairs issues properly belong to Congress, the branch that possesses the constitutional authority to address foreign policy in lawmaking,
which alone has the institutional capacity to craft the nuanced policies needed to navigate such dangerous waters. For courts to step in and bless unilateral executive
action would displace Congress’s proper role. And it
would disrupt the constitutionally mandated conversation between Congress and the Executive over how these
issues ought to be handled, diminishing any incentive for
the branches to engage in the heavy lifting needed to
craft appropriate international and domestic policy solutions.
Congress likewise would never have allowed state
and local officials to insert themselves into these delicate
foreign-affairs issues. They are among the “governmental entities” that Congress permits to use Section 2703’s
warrant provision. 18 U.S.C. § 2711(4). But they lack the
competence, constitutional authority, and political accountability to our national polity that Congress would
certainly have demanded of anyone it had chosen to assume such sensitive duties.
The cacophony of different voices introduced under
the Government’s interpretation also undermines the
principle that the government must speak with “one
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voice” in foreign affairs. Japan Line, Ltd. v. Cty. of Los
Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 449 (1979). And it risks “impinging
on the discretion of the Legislative and Executive
Branches in managing foreign affairs.” Kiobal, 569 U.S.
at 116 (internal quotation omitted). How could Congress
promise to engage in consensual processes for handling
data in negotiations with other countries, while at the
same time authorizing other actors—those over which it
has no direct control—to proceed unilaterally? More importantly, why would Congress ever put itself into that
untenable position in the first place? The Government
cannot answer these concerns.
Further, the Government’s narrow approach to extraterritoriality also depends upon the idea that electronic
incursions ought to count less—or not count at all—in
the focus analysis. That seed should be allowed no room
to spread, as it would undermine the basic bargain between Congress and the Court about how the laws Congress enacts will be applied over time. When Congress
enacts laws, it makes use of the Court’s cautious approach to extraterritoriality, and counts on the courts to
maintain a consistent application of those doctrines over
time. That allows Congress to legislate with confidence
that those doctrines will protect the territorial limits of
its laws, so unforeseen circumstances do not create unintended international implications for purely domestic
laws. Indeed, the enactment of the SCA is a perfect illustration of this phenomenon. The Court’s extraterritorially doctrines are thus a hedge against the march of technological change and the expansion of global information
networks, meant to halt extraterritorial creep at the
border. They should not be interpreted to facilitate it.
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If the Government’s approach to extraterritoriality
became the law, it would mean that as the world changes
and becomes even more globalized, Congress will have to
periodically revise its own domestic laws simply to ensure that they remain domestic, and must devote resources to anticipating and monitoring extraterritorial
creep. That reverses the presumption against extraterritoriality, and forces Congress to do the work that it rightly counts on extraterritorial doctrine to do for it. For all
these reasons, the Government’s narrow view of the extraterritoriality analysis ought to be rejected.
C.

The Government’s concerns about protecting
law-enforcement efficacy are best addressed to
Congress.

The Government raises concerns that enforcing Section 2703’s domestic limits will hamper law enforcement.
It worries that making the ability to obtain evidence in
criminal investigations turn upon a “provider’s business
decision” might invite abuse, Gov’t Br. 42. It also raises
concerns that MLATs cannot provide a “reliable substitute” for a Section 2703 warrant because too few such
treaties exist, and proceeding through them can be a
slow, cumbersome, and uncertain process. Id. at 44.
Amici do not mean to minimize these concerns, but
they are addressed to the wrong body. The Government
provides nothing to suggest that Microsoft or any other
provider moves data to deliberately interfere with legitimate law-enforcement objectives. Congress would certainly care if any provider did engage in such shenanigans. And if Section 2703 does not currently meet law
enforcement needs, and unilateral seizures are truly
necessary to properly investigate transnational crimes,
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then the Government should explain to Congress why
the statute ought to be amended. That would provide
Congress its rightful opportunity to weigh the need for
such reforms against the international friction they
would inevitably foster. As Microsoft explains, this process is already ongoing, and Congress has given every
indication that it will take the Government’s legitimate
concerns into account. Likewise, if MLATs do not yet
provide a workable alternative, that should only spur the
U.S. to further engage internationally, so that it might
create more effective treaty solutions—and more of
them—and to develop international standards that will
address these difficult transnational problems as the
world changes.
***
In a rapidly shrinking world, dramatic changes related to transnational crime and data challenge traditional
understandings about territorial regulation. The Government may ultimately convince Congress that the policy reasons supporting its position are stronger than the
policy reasons supporting Microsoft’s. But these complicated policy issues implicate important principles of international law. Both the Charming Betsy canon and the
law of extraterritoriality require that in such instances
the Court not act, but allow Congress to act first. Pushing the Executive to engage with Congress is the right
result.
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CONCLUSION
The judgment of the court of appeals should be affirmed.
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